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ABSTRACT
Many middle-income workers save for retirement through 401(k) plans. This study addresses the concern that low
account balances of older workers may indicate that these vehicles are not sufficient to insure adequate retirement
savings. In particular, the study shows that workers are not persistent (continuing once a worker has started) in
contributing, and a weak stock market exacerbates the problem.
The study suggests that the concept of inertia, which is in vogue in behavioral economics, does not seem to hold for
401(k) saving behavior. Furthermore, the investment strategy of dollar cost averaging does not seem to hold, either.
Using panel data (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) covering a six-year time span from 1999 to 2005, the study
presents descriptive and econometric evidence about the persistence behavior of individuals with 401(k) accounts. In
particular, the PSID data that were analyzed come from four biannual waves in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005.
Descriptive data show that of the sample of household heads aged 21-65 in 2005 who were employed in every time
period, only about one-third (35 percent) contributed to their plan in all four waves. Job changing had an impact.
However, even for individuals in the sample who did not change jobs, less than half (46 percent) contributed in all
four years of the survey.
An equation modeling 401(k) contribution behavior was estimated using logit regression analysis. When this model
was estimated with the sample of individuals who were employed in each panel and with the sample of individuals
who were employed in each panel and never changed jobs, the coefficient on the Dow Jones Industrial Average was
positive and significant. Workers contributed to their plans when the market was up. This investment error is called
herd investing, where individuals get into the market when it is high and not when it is low.
The study concludes that the findings have important implications for the pension system and adequacy of
retirement income. Projections of future retirement income readiness that assume that workers persistently contribute
over their working lives greatly exaggerate the future levels of pension assets workers will have accumulated.
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The Persistence of Employee 401(k) Contributions over a Major Stock Market Cycle:
Evidence on the Limited Power of Inertia on Savings Behavior
Leslie A. Muller and John A. Turner
Have workers accumulated sufficient retirement savings? Munnell, Webb, and GolubSass (2009) find that half of U.S. workers have insufficient savings to be on track for having
adequate retirement income. Scholz and Seshadri (2008), however, using different assumptions,
find a smaller percentage, but a substantial minority, to have insufficient savings. Other than
Social Security, middle-income workers save for retirement largely through 401(k) plans. Thus,
these findings of insufficient saving lead to a question about the adequacy of worker savings
through 401(k) plans for at least some workers. The low account balances accumulated by many
older workers are a direct indication of the possible insufficiency of savings through these plans.
One aspect of this issue is the persistency of worker contributions. Persistency refers to
whether workers continue contributing, and for how long, once they have started. Whether
workers display persistency in contributing to their 401(k) plans is important from a policy
perspective. Projections of final retirement wealth, such as the two cited above, are often made
using micro simulation models, which have their own set of assumptions regarding contribution
persistence. If these models incorrectly assume that once a worker contributes he will contribute
for the remainder of his working life, these projections will be too high, falsely indicating that
workers will have adequate savings at retirement. In addition, workers who do not contribute
consistently do not benefit from dollar cost averaging, which is likely to decrease rates of return
on 401(k) balances, leading to even lower retirement wealth. 1 Dollar cost averaging occurs
when the 401(k) participant consistently contributes the same dollar amount, regardless of
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whether the stock market is up or down. By doing so, the participant automatically purchases
more shares when the stock market is down than when it is up.
Results from behavioral economics suggest that inertia would cause workers who began
contributing to their 401(k) plans to continue doing so, as long as they remained with the same
employer. 2 Inertia, sometimes called status quo bias, refers to a psychological propensity to not
make changes but to continue doing what one is doing. Relating to pensions, inertia would cause
contributors to continue contributing. That clearly would be the path of least resistance, since
stopping contributions would require action on the individual's part. Inertia involves not making
changes to a greater degree than would be predicted solely taking into account the transactions
costs involved in making changes. However, it does not necessarily imply the complete absence
of change. Presumably, if the incentives are sufficiently great, workers overcome inertia.
In this paper, we investigate the power of inertia on worker pension contributions over a
period of a number of years. In particular, we investigate the hypothesis that inertia would cause
workers who are contributing to a 401(k) plan to continue doing so.
This hypothesis thus relates to the limits of the traditional model of rational behavior. It
has relevance for the policy idea that automatic enrollment in defined contribution plans is a way
to encourage participation in those plans because, due to inertia, workers will continue
contributing once they have been enrolled.
This paper uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to investigate an aspect of
the issue of persistency of contributions, which is: Do workers persistently contribute to 401(k)
plans over stock market cycles? 3 Because workers may stop contributing during periods of stock
market decline, examining contributions over a stock market cycle may provide insight into what
may be a cause of inconsistent contributions over time. The dramatic rise in the stock market
2

over the late 1990s, followed by the dramatic decline, and then the subsequent rise to all time
highs, provides a particularly volatile period to examine the persistency of 401(k) contributions.
Examining persistency of worker contributions over this period may also provide insight
into the savings behavior of workers. Are workers target savers, offsetting the stock market
decline by investing more? Or are workers “herd investors,” putting money in the stock market
when it is doing well, and becoming discouraged and not contributing when it is doing poorly?
Or might workers be “inertia investors,” contributing regardless of the state of the stock market?
The relative prevalence of these three types of worker-investors may have important implications
for the adequacy of worker preparedness for retirement.

RESEARCH GOALS
Our research has a number of goals: 4
1) It documents the density and the persistency of workers’ pension contributions. The
density of contributions is the percentage of years in which the worker contributes.
Persistency refers to whether workers continue contributing to their plan after they
make their first contribution. It also describes how long they continue to contribute.
2) It describes how persistency varies across population groups.
3) It analyzes the variation in participation across workers using multivariate regression
analysis. What factors explain why people who are covered by pensions stop
contributing to them?
4) It investigates the effect of changes in the stock market over time on participation.
Participation is measured by whether the worker is contributing.
5) It provides evidence on the prevalence of different types of investors among 401(k)
participants.
6) It investigates the extent to which differences in pension participation across
population groups are due to differences in persistence of contributions.
3

Based on the life cycle hypothesis, where workers reduce savings during downturns in
their incomes, we hypothesize that contribution persistence, or “inertia” investing, is more likely
when workers have stable earnings patterns and stable demographics—marital status, family
size, and health. Smith, Johnson, and Muller (2004) find that result for some changes of
circumstances. We hypothesize that “herd” investing, which is an investment error, is more
likely to occur among lower-income people, who presumably have less financial sophistication.
Previous research, reviewed in Turner (2003), found that lower-educated workers were more
likely to make errors in investment decisions than more highly educated workers. We
hypothesize that “target” investing is more likely to occur among lower- and middle-income
workers than upper-income workers because lower- and middle-income workers are more likely
to be weighing trade-offs of present versus future consumption than upper-income workers, for
whom savings for bequests is more likely to be where trade-offs occur.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
While simulations that project the future retirement income of workers often assume
continuous years of contributions, workers may not persist in their contributions to their plans,
but instead contribute intermittently. Because of family responsibilities or other reasons,
workers may face times when they are either unemployed or out of the labor market. Even when
workers are in the labor market, their pension contributions may vary over time due to changes
in their needs, their earnings, whether their job provides a pension, the availability and
generosity of employer matching contributions, or their perceptions as to the optimal timing of
contributions over stock market cycles.
4

These effects on pension contributions may be correlated with the stock market price
changes. When stock prices are low, which is a good time to buy, workers’ pension contributions
may also be low or cease. This could occur for several reasons. First, some workers get
discouraged when the stock market is declining and stop contributing. For others, their incomes
may fall, such as when work hours are reduced. Alternatively, however, if workers have a target
account balance, they may vary their contributions to offset capital market changes.
These risks influence the worker’s pension accumulations through their effect on the
level, density, and timing of a worker’s pension contributions and preretirement withdrawals.
The density of contributions is the proportion of the working life that he or she contributes to a
pension.
We investigate whether variability in earnings affects the time pattern of savings in
401(k) plans. When workers have uneven earnings profiles, they may reduce their savings during
periods when their earnings are relatively low to maintain their consumption levels during those
periods. This cyclical pattern of savings is at odds with the approach recommended for investing
of dollar-cost averaging investments by investing the same amount each period, regardless of the
state of financial markets (State Farm 2010).
Variability in pension contributions over time may be affected by the degree of risk
aversion of the pension participant (Blake, Cairns, and Dowd 2007). If participants have a target
level of pension assets and their level of assets declines, they may contribute more to offset the
decline. If so, then participants with greater holdings in equity may have greater volatility in
pension contributions. Thus, variability in pension contributions over time may be partly the
result of human capital risk resulting in variability in earnings (Mitchell and Turner 2010) and
partly the result of capital market risk.
5

LITERATURE ON 401(K) PERSISTENCY
When the stock market declines and the economy is doing poorly, the life cycle model
predicts that some people with 401(k) accounts may reduce their pension contributions to smooth
their consumption over time, attempting to maintain their level of consumption in a lagging
economy. A study by Putnam investors finds that in 2008, 21 percent of 401(k) plan participants
had reduced their contributions and 4 percent had stopped contributing due to the economic
downturn (O’Connor-Grant 2008). An Irish study conducted in 2009 found that a third of
defined contribution plan participants had reduced or eliminated their contributions
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009).
On the other hand, surveys indicate that some older people nearing their target retirement
dates increase their contributions to reach their target level of savings before retirement (Mincer
2008). Thus, the pattern may vary by the age and number of years from the expected date of
retirement of the worker.
Seligman and Wenger (2005) suggest that investment market returns may rise during
periods of unemployment to the extent that the stock market is a leading indicator, with stock
prices rising before unemployment falls. If true, unemployed workers might systematically miss
opportunities to invest when equity prices are low. Their results suggest that such
unemployment-related losses are larger for low-wage workers because they are more prone to
job loss.
While a number of cross-sectional studies have examined determinants of pension
contributions in the United States and in the United Kingdom, only a couple of studies have
examined the persistency of workers’ contributions over time. 5 Smith, Johnson, and Muller
(2004) use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to look at the persistency of
6

employee contributions to 401(k) plans for up to 12 years. They find that 19 percent of
contributors displayed intermittent patterns (i.e., had breaks in their contributions) and
contribution rates tended to vary over time.
While the empirical analysis focuses on 401(k) contribution plans, Individual Retirement
Accounts also provide evidence as to the persistency of worker contributions. Smith (2001),
using a sample of tax returns from 1987–1996, finds a high rate of initial drop off in pension
contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Thus, worker contributions to IRAs
indicate a lack of persistence to those plans. While this evidence does not directly relate to
worker behavior in 401(k) plans, it suggests a pattern of lack of persistence in contributions. Of
those contributing in 1987, only 45 percent were still contributing in 1992, with 40 percent
contributing through 1996. Smith (2006) uses the British Household Panel Survey to examine
the issue of persistency of contributions to individual account defined contribution plans. Her
results suggest a link between pension contributions and changes in an individual’s income
needs, measured by financial circumstances, health, having a baby, and moving to a new house.
Data from Canada indicate that between 1991 and 1993, about half of participants in
Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs, similar in some respects to IRAs, contributed in
only one or two of the three years (Maser 1995). A more recent study for Canada has found that
contributions to RRSPs varied considerably from year to year as workers’ earnings varied
(LeBlanc 2002). The same study finds that people with significant earnings reductions during
working years accounted for most of the withdrawals from RRSPs before retirement.
Sailer, Bryant, and Holden (2006) use panel data on individual income tax returns
combined with W-2s and other informational documents to study the persistence of contributions
to IRAs and 401(k) plans over the period 1999–2002. They find that in 2002, 35 percent of those
7

who had contributed in 1999 to an IRA also contributed in 2000, 2001, and 2002. By
comparison, for persons who filed tax returns in all years, they find a persistency of over 60
percent for 401(k) contributions over the same period
Employer contributions also may vary. During the stock market decline of 2001–2002,
some U.S. companies that were especially hard hit, such as Ford and Bethlehem Steel, suspended
their employer contributions to save money (Marquez 2008). Further suspensions occurred
during the stock market decline starting in late 2007, as indicated by a listing of more than 300
companies compiled by the Pension Rights Center (2010). Employers are permitted to suspend
their contributions at any time, so long as they are not obligated by labor contracts to maintain
them.

DATA
We use the PSID, a nationally representative longitudinal survey of over 9,000 families.
The research design involves creating longitudinal records for the heads of household at four
points: 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005. Our sample consists of all current workers in each wave,
ages 21–65 in 2005. Workers who provided contribution amounts in response to the survey are
counted as contributing to a plan. This use of the PSID is unique to the analysis of 401(k)
contribution behavior, as no previous study has a representative sample of individuals throughout
a long period of time over a stock market cycle.
Table 1 presents information on the monthly average closing prices for the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) for the period over which the data were collected. The majority of
interviews are conducted in the months March through June. 6 It indicates that the survey months
in the years 1999, 2001, and 2005 were periods of relatively high closing prices, while 2003 was
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a period of relatively low closing prices. The data point for 1999 corresponds to a point near the
peak of the stock market; for 2003, a point near the bottom; and for 2005, a point representing a
substantial rebound. Since a majority of the surveys were done in May and June, and the
differences in the DJIA between the two months in all waves is small, we use the May average of
each year in our analysis.

Table 1 Dow Jones Industrial Average Closing Prices ($)
DJIA monthly
March–June

DJIA
Year

May

June

High

Low

1999

10,522

10,971

10,971

9,786

2001

10,912

10,502

10,912

9,878

2003

8,859

8,985

8,985

7,992

2005

10,467

10,275

10,503

10,193

SOURCE: Yahoo Finance. http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EDJI&a=02&b=1&c=1999&d=11&e=31&f=2005&g=m.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
This section presents results examining the persistency of pension contributions over a
stock market cycle. It examines responses to the question, “What amount or percent of pay do
you voluntarily contribute currently?”
Percent Currently Contributing and the Stock Market
Table 2 presents basic descriptive statistics on the number of workers contributing in
different years. The main point to be drawn from Table 2 is that the percentage of workers
contributing to a 401(k) plan is positively correlated with the DJIA, with a drop in the percentage
of workers contributing in 2003, when the DJIA was at a low. This is evidence of an error in the
investment pattern of some workers—not contributing when the stock market is low and
9

contributing when the stock market is high. This pattern leads to lower accumulated assets than
would be expected from a simulation that does not recognize the pattern.
A possible upward trend that is suggested by the increase in percentage contributing in
2005 may be due to two factors. First, the sample is getting successively older in each
subsequent survey. Pension participation rates tend to increase with age. Second, the coverage
rate of 401(k) plans has continued to grow over time.

Table 2 Percent of Workers Contributing to a 401(k) Plan During the Stock Market Cycle
Year

Number contributing

Percent of workers

DJIA— May

1999

1,043

36

10,522

2001

1,031

36

10,912

2003

936

32

8,859

2005

1,122

39

10,467

SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations from PSID. Sample includes individuals who worked in all four panels. N=2,896. Sample is
weighted.

In addition to investigating the relationship of contribution persistence to changes in the
stock market, we also examine more broadly the patterns and determinants of the persistence of
contributions. In the regression analysis, we return to the issue of the effect of the stock market
on contribution persistence.
Density of Contributions
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the density of pension contributions over the
years 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005 for workers who worked in each of the four years. The density
of pension contributions is defined here as the percentage of the four sample years in which the
worker contributed. The largest group—36 percent—is people who contributed in none of the
sample months for the four waves. Among workers who contributed, 31 percent contributed in
only one year, while 20 percent contributed all four years. Thus, we find little evidence of
10

persistency in contributions. This finding suggests that inertia is hardly a factor, and that workers
do not engage in dollar cost averaging. In the following tables, we explore this finding further.

Table 3 Density of Pension Contributions over Four Sample Years (1999, 2001, 2003, 2005) for People Who
Worked all Four Years
Number of years in which pension
contribution was made

Frequency

Percent

Percent of
contributors

Percent of contributors
contributing at least x years

0

1,043

36

n/a

n/a

1

570

20

31

100

2

496

17

27

69

3

412

14

22

42

4

375

13

20

20

TOTAL

2,896

100.0

100.0

—

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. Total number of contributors = 1,852. Sample is weighted.

Table 4 repeats Table 3 but for the sample of people contributing in 1999. Even though
the density of contributions is higher for this group, it still indicates a low density of
contributions. For people starting out the period in 1999 as contributors, 85 percent contributed
at least half of the years, but only 35 percent contributed all four years. Thus, this table presents
strong evidence against inertia causing persistence in contributions, even among people who
worked in all four sample periods and began the portion of the PSID studied as contributors.

Table 4 Density of Pension Contributions over Four Sample Years for Persons Contributing in 1999, for
People Who Worked All Four Years
Number of years in which pension
contribution was made

Frequency

Percent

Percent of contributors
contributing at least x years

1

157

15

100

2

219

21

85

3

302

29

64

4

365

35

35

TOTAL

1,043

100.0

—

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. Sample is weighted.
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Changing jobs can result in a worker who initially was able to participate in a pension
plan subsequently not being able to do so. Table 5 examines the density of contributions for
people who contributed in 1999, worked all four sample years, and did not change jobs. 7 Even
for this group, less than half (46 percent) contributed in all four years.

Table 5 Density of Pension Contributions over Four Sample Years for Persons Contributing in 1999, for
People Who Worked All Four Years and Did Not Change Jobs during That Time Period
Number of years in which pension
contribution was made

Frequency

Percent

Percent of contributors
contributing at least x years

1

57

11

100

2

93

17

90

3

143

26

72

4

252

46

46

TOTAL

545

100.0

—

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. Sample is weighted.

Table 6 drops the restriction that the respondent worked in all four years. Thus, in this
table some workers may not persist in contributing to a pension because they have stopped
working. In this larger group of workers, 20 percent who contributed in 1999 only contributed
that year, with 29 percent contributing in all four years. Thus, these data show a very low density
of pension contributions, due in part to lack of persistency of work.

Table 6 Density of Pension Contributions over Four Sample Years for Persons Contributing in 1999,
Including People Who Did Not Work in All Four Years
Number of years in which pension
contribution was made

Frequency

Percent

Percent of contributors
contributing at least x years

1

243

20

100

2

275

23

80

3

335

28

57

4

357

29

29

TOTAL

1,212

100.0

—

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. Sample is weighted.
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Persistency of Contributions
In this section, we examine the persistency of contributions to 401(k)-type plans. We
define persistency as the percentage of workers contributing in a base year who continue to
contribute in consecutive subsequent years.
To persist in contributing, it is necessary to persist in working. Therefore, we first
examine persistency in working. Table 7 indicates that of those working in 1999, 81 percent
worked all four sample years.

Table 7 Persistency of Work
Percent who worked in year x and in all subsequent sample periods up to:
Year

2001

2003

2005

1999

92

86

81

2001

—

91

90

2003

—

—

92

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. Sample is weighted.

Table 8 examines evidence on the persistency of contributions. It provides evidence as to
a low persistency of contributions, but one that also varies over time.

Table 8 Persistency of Contributions, for People Who Worked All Four Years
Percent of workers in year x that contributed in year x and in all subsequent sample
Year in which contribution periods up to:
was made
2001
2003
2005
1999

67

44

36

2001

—

59

46

2003

—

—

71

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. Sample is weighted.

Table 9 examines a slightly different concept from density or persistency. It examines
what percentage of workers who contributed in 1999 also contributed in a particular subsequent
13

year. We include this measure to provide an alternative measure of the extent that workers
contribute consistently. Sixty-three percent of workers who contributed in 1999 also contributed
in 2001.

Table 9 Percentage of Workers Who Contributed in 1999 Who Contributed in the Year Indicated, for
People Who Worked All Four Years
Year in which contribution was made

Frequency

Percent

1999

1,072

100

2001

671

63

2003

584

54

2005

663

62

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. Sample is weighted.

Persistency of Contributions for Workers in the Same Job, by Demographic and Economic
Group
In this section, we examine persistency of contributions for workers in the same job for
all four panels generally, then broken down by demographic and economic group. Table 10
investigates persistency for workers in the same job. When comparing the sample of all workers
in Table 8 to this table, as would be expected we see a much higher persistency with workers in
the same job.

Table 10 Persistency of Contributions, for Workers in the Same Job over All Panel Years
Percent of workers in year x that contributed in year x and in all subsequent sample
Year in which contribution periods up to:
was made
2001
2003
2005
1999

71

53

46

2001

—

66

61

2003

—

—

81

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. Sample is weighted.

Table 11 reports persistency by race. The persistency for whites over the period is
consistently considerably higher than for blacks. This finding would explain lower participation
14

rates for blacks than whites and lower accumulated account balances. The sample sizes for
Hispanics and “other” races are too small to provide separate estimates.
Table 11 Persistency of Contributions, by Race, for Workers in the Same Job over All Panel Years
Percent of workers in year x that contributed in year x and in all subsequent sample
periods up to:
Year in which contribution
was made

2001

2003

2005

White

Black

White

Black

White

Black

1999

76

56

56

36

52

32

2001

—

—

68

55

63

45

2003

—

—

—

—

82

76

NOTE: The sample for Hispanics is 19 and for “other” races is 17.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. Sample includes individuals who worked all four years. Sample is
weighted. 1999 sample size for whites (382) and blacks (129).

Table 12 investigates persistency by gender. It finds little difference in persistency by
gender for workers not changing jobs.

Table 12 Persistency of Contributions, by Gender, for Workers in the Same Job over All Panel Years
Percent of workers in year x that contributed in year x and in all subsequent sample
periods up to:
Year in which
contribution was made

2001

2003

2005

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

1999

71

66

52

58

48

52

2001

—

—

66

66

62

56

2003

—

—

—

—

82

81

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. Sample includes individuals who worked all four years. 1999 weighted
sample sizes for males (469) and females (76). Sample is weighted.

Table 13 investigates persistency by education level, finding relatively little difference by
education level. Fifty-one percent of college graduates contribute over the four panels, while 48
percent of high school graduates do. Workers with lower levels of education may have lower
persistency because educated individuals may see a higher value in dollar cost averaging and
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saving for the future. That effect may be offset to some extent if more educated individuals are
more adept at making changes in their pension status.

Table 13 Persistency of Contributions, by Education, for Workers in the Same Job over All Panel Years
Percent of workers in year x that contributed in year x and in all subsequent sample
periods up to:
2001

2003

2005

Year in which contribution
was made

hsdeg

colldeg

hsdeg

colldeg

hsdeg

colldeg

1999

74

71

53

55

48

51

2001

—

—

66

68

63

62

2003

—

—

—

—

74

85

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. Sample includes individuals who worked all four years. Weighted 1999
sample size for those whose highest degree is high school (186) and college degree (317). Note that the sample size for workers
without a high school degree is too small to be of statistical value. Sample is weighted.

Table 14 investigates persistency by quartile of family income. As theory would predict,
higher levels of family income are consistent with higher persistency. These effects are
considerably larger than the effects found for differences in education level.

Table 14 Persistency of Contributions, by Quartile of 1999 Family Income, for Workers in the Same Job
over All Panel Years
Percent of workers in year x that contributed in year x and in all subsequent sample
periods up to:
2001

2003

2005

Year in which contribution
was made

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

1999

55

68

69

78

48

51

54

56

42

48

53

49

2001

—

—

—

—

60

57

73

67

49

53

70

63

2003

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

73

78

83

85

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from PSID surveys. First quartile includes family income of $0–$40,000, second quartile
$40,001–$60,000, third quartile $60,001–$90,000, fourth quartile $90,001 and over. Sample includes individuals who worked
all four years. 1999 sample size for 1st quartile (75), 2nd quartile (120), 3rd quartile (147), and 4th quartile (212). Sample is
weighted.
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ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
From the analysis in Table 2, it appears that there is a positive relationship between
401(k) participation and prices in the stock market. The marked drop in participation in 2003
coincides with the low in the stock market in that year. In this section, we present a regression
model that controls for other variables that may also affect participation.
There are two goals in this section: to estimate whether the DJIA is correlated with
401(k) participation, and to examine whether the usual demographic, financial, and job-related
characteristics from previous cross-sectional research continue to play a role in participation over
time. Previous models of 401(k) participation have not taken into consideration the potential bias
in the OLS estimates when not controlling for unobserved tastes for saving. 8,9 We begin with
specifying a general model for 401(k) participation, and then amend the model to include our
variable of interest, the DJIA.
A General Model for 401(k) Participation
Over the years, economists have identified numerous motives for saving, including life
cycle consumption smoothing, precautionary motives, and bequest intent. These theories identify
personal characteristics that may affect the saving decision, including risk aversion, future
discount rate, and liquidity constraints. More recent research adds to the list by identifying other
effects on the saving choice, such as financial education and/or knowledge (Bernheim and
Garrett 2003; Agnew, Utkus, and Young 2007), trust (Agnew, Utkus, and Young 2007), lack of
self control (Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman 2005), inertia and procrastination (Choi, Laibson,
and Madrian2004), and childhood upbringing (Becker 1996). 10
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While some of these characteristics can be explicitly controlled for in an econometric
model, many of them are unobservable or difficult to measure. 11 Hence, estimation using an
unobservable effects model allows the individual unobservables to be controlled for, leading to
consistent estimates. After careful consideration as to the most appropriate estimation technique,
we are using fixed effects logit estimation. 12 Hence, following the notation in Wooldridge
(2002), our model is
(1)

yit = xitβ + ci + uit ,

where i denotes each individual and t denotes the time period, where t = 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005.
The dependent variable yit is a binary choice variable modeling whether the worker participated
in the 401(k) plan. The matrix xit includes independent variables thought to affect the
participation decision. The variable ci is the time-invariant individual unobservable effect. The
idiosyncratic error term is uit.
In choosing the independent variables, we look to economic theory and previous
empirical models of 401(k) participation. Englehardt and Kumar (2007) develop a theoretical
model of 401(k) participation that includes such demographic variables as age, race, education,
marital status, number of children, and gender. Age is a proxy for the stage in the life cycle,
marital status for precautionary motives (e.g., more security in marriage), and number of children
for bequest motives. Furthermore, Bernheim and Scholz (1993) find that college-educated
individuals are more likely to engage in more sophisticated financial planning and save more
adequately for retirement.
By construction, in order for fixed-effects to control for the unobservable effects, it also
differences out the time-invariant variables. Hence, we are unable to include race, gender, and
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education in the model. We will address the consequences of not including these variables when
discussing the results.
We also control for financial variables such as family income, net wealth, and whether
the person currently has another pension plan. Family income identifies the tax bracket for the
family, and both family income and net wealth control for liquidity constraints. More family
income may push the family into a higher tax bracket, hence providing more tax savings from
participating in a 401(k) plan, increasing the probability of participating. Higher income and net
wealth affords the family more liquidity to pay for current expenses; hence we expect a positive
coefficient estimate on these two independent variables. Finally, economic theory suggests that
having another pension plan could signal the individual as a saver, increasing the probability of
participation. On the other hand, additional saving wealth could also diminish the chance of
saving in another vehicle if the person is a target saver. Thus, the sign of the expected coefficient
estimate is ambiguous.
Unfortunately, the PSID does not provide data on whether a nonparticipant is eligible for
participation in a pension plan. Hence, we include part-time status as a control variable, since
part-time employees are less likely to be eligible for a plan. Tenure acts much like age, as a
proxy for stage in the life cycle, and may affect eligibility in the 401(k) plan. Starting in an
individual’s twenties until ages closer to retirement, we would expect a positive relationship
between tenure and participation. To proxy for precautionary saving motives, we also include a
binary variable describing whether the individual considers himself in good health. 13 Bad health
could cause an individual to save less in a 401(k) plan because of the difficulty of withdrawing
funds from the retirement plan if medical expenses arise. Finally, due to the strong housing
market throughout the stock market cycle, we control for this alternative investment to the
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401(k) plan with state housing price indices for all panel years. Anecdotal evidence throughout
the survey period suggests that some individuals were investing in real estate instead of
retirement plans during periods of high housing prices. Hence, we would expect individuals in
states with higher price indexes to invest more in real estate than 401(k) plans, resulting in a
negative coefficient estimate. 14
The inclusion of the individual unobservable effect in this model is an important addition
to the literature. The other longitudinal study on 401(k) behavior by Smith, Johnson, and Muller
(2004) uses pooled ordinary least squares (POLS), which does not take advantage of the ability
to control for the unobservable effects. Estimation by POLS results in the unobserved tastes for
saving being put into the error term, and if one reasonably assumes correlation of ci with the
explanatory variables, it will provide biased estimates.
Adding in the stock market variable
To investigate the correlation between changes in the stock market and persistency in
participation and contribution rates, we add to Equation (1) a continuous variable, zt, that
represents the natural log of the DJIA:
(2)

yit = xitβ + δ zt+ ci + uit ,

where zt varies across time, t = 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005.
Results
We report regression results for two samples in Table 15. In both samples, the
relationship between the DJIA and the probability of participating in a 401(k) plan is positive
and statistically significant at a 1 percent level. This is true whether a worker changes jobs or
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remains in the same position throughout the panel. The higher the DJIA, the more likely the
worker is to participate in the company 401(k) plan, even controlling for factors such as the
fluctuations within the housing market.
If inertia is the driving force behind contribution decisions, the inclusion of the stock
market variable should be statistically insignificant. This is not the case. Instead, workers are
more likely to participate if the stock market is higher. This type of behavior can be described as
“herd” investing, where individuals get into the market when it is high and get out when it is low.
This is an investment error, as the worker is getting into the stock market when it is high and
getting out when it is low.
As expected, the effect of family income on participation is positive and highly
statistically significant. The estimate on whether the worker has another pension plan is also
positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This result suggests that even after taking into
account unobservable tastes for saving, workers who have one pension plan are likely to see
value in participating in the 401(k) plan. This increased likelihood could be due to the experience
of already having a plan and feeling confident in managing one’s own assets. Since the PSID
does not distinguish between offering a plan and worker eligibility, having another pension plan
could also signal eligibility and hence a greater chance of participating.
We believe the consequences of omitting education, race, and gender from the regression
are minor. Since income and education are known to be positively correlated, it is probable that
simply controlling for family income is sufficient to capture educational effects. In addition,
highly educated workers are more likely to have financially sophisticated time horizons for
saving, as well as an appreciation for the value of saving and planning for retirement. These
tastes for saving are captured in the unobservable effect, which is controlled for in our model.
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Gender has consistently been found to be statistically insignificant in previous participation
models. 15 Furthermore, although a few studies have found that race affects participation, these
effects are due to a lower confidence in financial investing and distrust in financial institutions,
which would be captured in the unobservable effect. 16

Table 15 Fixed Effect Logit Estimates, Using Two Samples
Independent variable

Sample: Individual worked in all four
panel years

Sample: Individual worked in the same
job in all four panel years

age

−0.06
(0.11)

−0.80
(0.14)

agesq

0.0008
(0.001)

0.0006
(0.002)

married

0.32
(0.29)

0.19
(0.39)

number of children

0.03
(0.10)

0.05
(0.12)

family income

2.5e-06 **
(9.3e-09 )

1.3e-06
(2.2e-06 )

net wealth

−8.8 e-09
(5.8e-08 )

−4.1 e-08
(8.8e-08 )

has other pension plan

3.3**
(0.17)

2.8**
(0.23)

tenure

-0.005
(0.01)

0.04
(0.02)

part time status

−0.45
(0.42)

−0.45
(0.62)

health good

0.10
(0.01)

0.008
(0.38)

log of DJIA

4.09**
(0.61)

4.97**
(0.80)

state housing index

0.002
(0.002)

0.001
(0.003)

N

3,138

1,551

Log likelihood

−730.4

−425.7

NOTE: Dependent variable is whether the individual participated in a 401(k) plan in that year. ** statistically significant at the
1% level.
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CONCLUSIONS
We reject the hypothesis that inertia in contributions is the main motivating force.
Regression results show a positive, statistically significant effect of the level of the DJIA on
401(k) participation over time. We also find a low density and low persistence in contributions
over a fairly short period of time. This result varies across demographic and economic groups in
predictable ways, with workers in the same job over the period and with high education or high
income having relatively high persistency, but other groups not having a high degree of
persistency. Lack of persistency occurs when workers change jobs and when they don’t.
Generally, lack of persistency because of job changes accounts for less than half of the lack of
persistency among workers initially contributing to a pension. The degree of persistence varies
over time, depending in part on the state of the stock market. It also depends on the length of the
time period considered. Our findings of relatively little persistency, compared to other studies,
occur in part because of the relatively long time period we examine (six years) and because of
the volatility in the stock market over this period.
These findings have important implications for the functioning of the pension system,
with its reliance on 401(k) plans. Projections of future retirement income readiness that assume
that workers persistently contribute over their working lives greatly overstate the future levels of
pension assets that workers will have accumulated. Our work suggests that perhaps many people
participating in 401(k) plans will not have accumulated adequate resources because they will not
have contributed to their plans a sufficient percentage of their adult working lives.
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APPENDIX

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CHOICE OF FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION
Theory suggests that the individual unobservable effect ci is likely correlated with at least
one of the independent variables in Equation (2). For example, if ci includes innate tastes for
saving, a person’s choice on whether to save and how much will affect the level of net worth and
whether the person has another pension plan. If these unobserved effects are not controlled for
(hence throwing them into the error term) estimating the model using pooled OLS will produce
inconsistent estimates.
Using either fixed or random effects estimation will eliminate the unobserved effects and
produce consistent estimates. However, while fixed effects estimates are consistent regardless of
whether the independent variables are correlated with the unobserved effects, consistent
estimates using random effects requires that the explanatory variables and the unobserved effects
be uncorrelated. As detailed in the paragraph above, there are reasons to believe that ci is
correlated with at least one of the explanatory variables. If this is the case, using random effects
will produce inconsistent estimates.
To confirm the decision to use fixed effects, we conduct a Hausman test. The null
hypothesis is that fixed and random effects produce estimates that are statistically the same, or
that ρ=0. If we reject the null hypothesis, then the strict exogeneity assumption is violated and
we should use fixed effects.
We estimate Equation (2) below using both fixed and random effects:
(2)

yit = xitβ + δ zt+ ci + uit
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The results are reported in Table A.1.
Table A.1 Estimates Using Random and Fixed Effects
Independent variable
Random effects

Fixed effects

age

−0.12
(0.07)

−0.80
(0.14)

agesq

0.001
(0.001)

0.0006
(0.002)

married

0.27
(0.18)

0.19
(0.39)

number of children

−0.04
(0.07)

0.05
(0.12)

family income

5.55e-06
(1.29e-06 )

1.3e-06
(2.2e-06 )

net wealth

−5.4 e-08
(7.29e-08 )

−4.1 e-08
(8.8e-08 )

has other pension plan

3.1
(0.17)

2.8
(0.23)

tenure

0.008
(0.009)

0.04
(0.02)

part time status

−0.67
(0.51)

−0.45
(0.62)

health good

0.50
(0.28)

0.008
(0.38)

log of DJIA

4.52
(0.73)

4.97
(0.80)

state housing index

0.16
(0.26)

0.001
(0.003)

ρ

0.45

NOTE: Dependent variable is whether the individual participated in a 401(k) plan in that year. χ2 = 198.

By looking at the estimates we can see a large difference between the random effects and
fixed effects estimates. This observation is verified by computing the χ2 statistic and comparing it
to the critical value at two degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis is clearly rejected, at both a 1
and 5 percent level. We conclude that the estimates are statistically different, making random
effects estimation inconsistent. Hence we choose to estimate the regression using fixed effects.

25

Notes
1. Dichev (2007) finds this result for investors generally.
2. See Choi et al. (2002) and Madrian and Shea (2001).
3. The relevant questions in the 2005 PSID to determine the type of pension begin at question P11 and P16 found on
the questionnaire. Because the term “401(k)” is not used when the interviewer asks about plan type, we must
determine which respondents have 401(k)-type plans. We define a 401(k) as a plan where money is accumulated in
an account, contributions are made by the employee, and the contributions are not required.
4. The effect on participation of an employer match is an important issue. However, the data do not provide
information on whether employers of workers who do not participate offer a match, so we are not able to examine
this issue here.
5. e.g., see Clark and Schieber (1998) and Munnell, Sunden, and Taylor (2002).
6. The interviews in 2001 were conducted in March–June (81 percent), with only 4 percent of interviews conducted
in September–November, when the market was very low.
7. The sample is restricted to workers who reported six or more years of tenure in 2005.
8. The obvious choices for controlling for unobserved effects in a cross-sectional model are to find suitable
instruments and/or proxy variables for taste for saving. To our knowledge, no studies on participation have been
done that employ either of these techniques.
9. Hurd, Lillard, and Panis (1998) develop a theoretical framework for choosing proxy variables for unobservable
saving preferences such as planning horizon, risk aversion, and bequest intent. They use these variables in
estimating who is likely to spend a lump sum distribution from a 401(k). Data were taken from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS), which includes questions that are not common in other large data sets. The HRS is
longitudinal, but not a good choice for this analysis because it focuses on near-retirees and retirees.
10. Becker’s (1996) conclusions are generalized to childhood experiences and upbringing affecting adult choices, of
which saving is one.
11. Net wealth can proxy for liquidity constraints, and age and/or tenure for stage in the life cycle (discount rate).
Whether the person has had financial education can be controlled for explicitly, however, a suitable proxy for
financial knowledge has not been established.
12. See the appendix for explanations and test results leading to our choice of fixed effects estimation.
13. Smith, Johnson, and Muller (2004) use a measure of self-reported health in their model as well. They also find a
statistically significant effect of having a child or purchasing a home in the current year on 401(k) participation. We
eliminate these variables from the model due to statistical insignificance.
14. On the other hand, if individuals are adding to new saving when participating in a 401(k), high housing prices
may make people feel as though they are richer (wealth effect), hence increasing 401(k) participation.
15. Englehardt and Kumar (2007) develop a theoretical model that does not include gender. Munnell, Sunden, and
Taylor (2002) and Bassett et al. (1998) also do not include gender as an explanatory variable.
16. See Shanmuganathan et al. (2004) and Lach (1999).
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